IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE KADUNA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
ON WEDNESDAY 9TH DAY OF JUNE, 2021
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. O. ADENIYI
SUIT NO: NICN/KD/45/2018
KADUNA STATE UNIVERSITY…………………CLAIMANT
DANIEL EMMANUEL S. KAWAI………………….DEFENDANT
J U D G M E N T
The Claimant is a Kaduna State Government tertiary educational institution, whilst the Defendant is a former employee in the Mathematical Sciences Department.
For starters, I should remark that this judgement was initially slated for 21st of April, 2021 but was further adjourned till today due to the industrial strike of the Judiciary Staff Union of Nigeria (JUSUN) which has prolonged until now.
The case of the Claimant as gleaned from the claims before the Court is that, an application for the sponsorship of the Defendant’s international training for doctorate degree (Ph.d) in Intelligent Computing program was approved by the Claimant and a bond was executed by both parties. Thereafter, the approved funds in the sum of Six Million, Nine Hundred and Nine Thousand, Three Hundred and Ninety-Five Naira, Twenty-Five Kobo (N6,909,395.25) was released by the Claimant’s Bankers, Main Street Bank to the Defendant’s United Bank for Africa Plc (UBA) account for him to proceed for the International training.
2. The Claimant allege that the Defendant was involved in a case of examination misconduct which was investigated; that a letter was immediately written to the Defendant’s Bankers, UBA to freeze the Defendant’s account particularly the said sum of Six Million, Nine Hundred and Nine Thousand, Three Hundred and Ninety-Five Naira, Twenty-Five Kobo and that after the conclusion of the investigation, the Defendant was indicted and removed from office by the Claimant’s Governing Council.
The Claimant contends that resulting from the Defendant’s removal, he was no longer entitled to the said sponsorship/training and grant of the funds; a Court order was obtained by the Claimant to freeze the said sum in the Defendant’s UBA account; that the Defendant also obtained another Court order to unfreeze his account and thereby made withdrawal from the account leaving a credit balance of N912,577.66. The said credit balance of N912,577.66 has been paid by the Defendant’s Bank to the Claimant leaving an outstanding sum of N5,996,817.59 (Five Million, Nine Hundred and Ninety-Six Thousand, Eight Hundred and Seventeen Naira, Fifty-Nine Kobo).
3. The Claimant thereby commenced the instant action; vide Complaint and Statement of Facts filed in this Court on 25/04/2018, whereby it claimed against the Defendant, the reliefs set out as follows:
a. The sum of N5,996,817.59 (Five Million, Nine Hundred and Ninety-Six Thousand, Eight Hundred and Seventeen Naira, Fifty-Nine Kobo) only being balance of money paid by the Claimant to the Defendant via Claimant’s account number 2022791388 with the United Bank of Africa Plc for sponsorship of Defendant’s international training which sponsorship he was no longer entitled to due to his removal from office of the Claimant.
b. Interest rate at 10% per annum on the sum of N5,996,807.59 from 11/08/2014 till judgement sum is finally liquidated.
c. Cost of filing the suit.
4. The Defendant joined issues with the Claimant by filing a Statement of Defence on 04/07/2019. The Defendant contended, in summary, that the application for sponsorship of his Ph.D was made to TETFUND and that the money released by the Claimant to cover his studies was from TETFUND and not the Claimant’s. The Defendant further contended that he was not given fair hearing on the allegation of misconduct. The Defendant also contended that the bond he executed with the Defendant for study fellowship did not contain any condition or covenant requiring the refund of the sponsorship fund.
The Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on 18/07/2019.
5. At the plenary trial, Ahmad Tijani Ibrahim, the Bursar of the Claimant testified as her sole witness. He adopted his Statements on Oath as his oral testimony and further tendered sixteen (16) sets of documents as exhibits to further substantiate the Claimant’s case. He was thereafter cross-examined by the Defendant’s learned counsel.
As I had earlier noted, the Defendant filed a Statement of Defence and his Statement on oath but elected to rest his case on that of the Claimant’s.
6. Thereafter, parties filed and exchanged their written final addresses as prescribed by the provisions of Order 45 of the Rules of this Court.
In the address filed on behalf of the Claimant on 19/11/2020, and settled by M. B. Tanko, Esq., of counsel for the Claimant, a sole issue was canvassed as having arisen for determination in this suit, that is:
“Whether or not, the Claimant has proved its case to be entitled to judgement as per the claims.”
In the final address filed on behalf of the Defendant on 09/12/2020, his learned counsel, Maxwell Kyon, Esq., identified two issues as having arisen for determination in this suit, namely:
1. Whether this Honourable Court is cloth (sic) with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit, same having been initiated in this Court via an improper process.
2. Whether the Claimant has established its case to warrant the grant of the reliefs sought in its favor.
The Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law to the Defendant’s written address was filed on 15/12/2020.
7. I have painstakingly examined the totality of the pleadings filed by both parties in contention; the totality of the admissible and relevant evidence adduced at the trial; and the written addresses and oral summations of learned gentlemen for the two parties; and my view is that two issues call for determination in this suit. Without prejudice to the other issues formulated for determination by the respective learned counsel, I shall proceed to determine this suit on the basis of the issues set out as follows:
1. What was the extent of the Defendant’s obligations under the bond agreement?
2. Considering the facts and evidence admissible in this case, is the Claimant entitled to the reliefs sought?
8. It is obvious from the learned counsel for the Defendant’s written address, that the first issue distilled by him is a jurisdictional issue. It is premised on the ground that the process adopted by the Claimant in initiating the suit was improper and the Court is urged to strike out the case for want of jurisdiction.
It is settled that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the question of the competence of the Court adjudicating. This is the reason the issue of jurisdiction takes precedence over all other issues whenever it arises. See Iwuji & Ors Vs Governor of Imo State & Ors LPELR 22824; Dangote Gen. Textile Products & Ors Ltd Vs Hascon Associates Nig Ltd & Anor  LPELR 20665
Permit me to also quickly affirm the trite position of the law, that in order to determine whether or not a Court can exercise jurisdiction over a matter, it is the facts averred in the Complaint and Statement of Facts and the reliefs endorsed therein alone, that the Court is required to examine and no more. See the cases of F.U.M.B. Ltd Vs Aerobell Nig Ltd  ALL FWLR (Pt 281) 1651 at 1677; Moyosore Vs Gov of Kwara State  NWLR (Pt 1293) 242; Guinness (Nig) PLC Vs SKA Nig Ltd  18 NWLR (Pt 1331) 179.
9. The grouse of the learned counsel for the Defendant is that the provision of the Section 24 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act (NICA) is unconstitutional, in that the National Assembly acted ultra vires by conferring additional powers on the High Court of the States. Learned counsel for the Defendant hinged his arguments principally on the ground that the National Assembly is not empowered to make law conferring additional power to the High Courts. Learned counsel thereby urged the Court to declare the provision of Section 24 (3) NICA unconstitutional and void to the extent of its inconsistency by virtue of Section 1 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
Learned Defendant counsel’s further argument is that the Kaduna State House of Assembly has not enacted any law empowering the High Court of Kaduna to transfer cases to the National Industrial Court and as such, the High Court of Kaduna State lacks the power under the provision of Section 24 (3) NICA to transfer cases to this Honourable Court. Learned counsel argued further that the order of transfer of the present case made by Hon. Justice Kurada of the High Court of Kaduna State to this Honourable Court is unconstitutional, null and void. Learned counsel finally urged the Honourable Court to set aside the order of the High Court of Kaduna State transferring the instant case to this Court. In support of his propositions, learned counsel cited inter-alia the cases of Fasakin Foods (Nig) Ltd Vs Shosanya  All FWLR (Pt 320) 1059; Akporido Vs Petroleum Training Institute  All FWLR (Pt 701) 1575; Alabi Vs National Assembly  All FWLR (Pt 803) 1830; Witt & Busch Limited Vs Dale Power Systems Plc  All FWLR (Pt 3820 1816.
10. In reaction to the issue at hand, learned counsel for the Claimant in his argument distinguished between the judicial power vested in the Courts under Section 6 of the Constitution (supra) and the jurisdictional power vested in this Honourable Court under Section 254C (1) of the Constitution (as amended) and Section 7 of NICA (supra). Learned Claimant’s counsel further argued that by virtue of these provisions, this Honourable Court lacks the power to declare the provisions as unconstitutional. Learned counsel also argued that parties cannot by connivance, acquiescence or collision confer jurisdiction on a Court.
11. Now, the single issue in contention here is whether by the provision of the Section 24 (3) of the National Industrial Court Act (NICA), the National Assembly acted ultra vires by conferring additional powers on the State High Court. To properly address this issue it will be expedient to embark on forage of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (supra).
Section 2 (1) and (2) of the Constitution provides:-
2 (1) Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign State to be known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
(2) Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory.
From the above provision, Nigeria operates a federal system of government. In modern terms, federalism is a system based upon democratic rules and institutions in which the power to govern is shared between the Central and State provincial governments in accordance with the terms and conditions proscribed by the subsisting Constitution.
12. The legislative powers of the Federal Government of Nigeria as well as the State Government are as prescribed in Section 4 of the Constitution and for the purpose of the issue in contention, the relevant provisions of the said section is herein below set out:-
4 (1) …………………………………………………………….
(2) The National Assembly shall have power to make law for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Executive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution.
(3) The power of the National Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List shall, save as otherwise provided in the Constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of Assembly of States.
(4) In addition and without prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection (2) of this section, the National Assembly shall have power to make laws with respect to the following matters, that is to say:-
(a) Any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part 11 of the Second Schedule to this Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto; and
(b) Any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
(5) If any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other Law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.
13. It is clear from the above provisions that the power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to matters included in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution is conferred on the National Assembly and that the exercise of the power thereto shall be to the exclusion of the State Houses of Assembly. In addition, the National Assembly is also conferred with powers to make laws with regard to any matter in the concurrent legislative list as set out in the First Column of Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution and only to the extent prescribed therein.
14. One point that clearly emerged from the provisions of Section 4 of the Constitution (supra) is that the powers to make laws by each tier of government has been defined and listed in the schedules to the Constitution or as per any other provision. Except, however for the fact that under Section 4 (5), where the law made by the House of Assembly is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void. See also the cases of A.G of the Federation Vs A. G Lagos State  16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 249; Osun State Independent Electoral Commission & Anor Vs Action Congress & Ors  19 NWLR (Pt 1226) 273; A. G Abia State Vs A. G of the Federation  6 NWLR (Pt 763) 264.
Without belabouring the issue of inconsistency or unconstitutionality as argued by the learned Defendant’s counsel, the National Assembly has the power to make law for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to labour, including trade unions, industrial relations; as set out in Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Constitution. In other words, the issue of inconsistency or unconstitutionality does not arise in the instant case. And I so hold.
15. The further contention of the learned counsel for the Defendant is that that unlike the powers conferred on this Honourable Court, pursuant to Section 24 (3) NICA, the High Court of Kaduna State cannot exercise the power to transfer cases to this Honourable Court. Learned counsel argued that the order of transfer made by Hon. Justice Kurada of the High Court of Kaduna State is unconstitutional, null and void.
I should note that in challenging the power of transfer of the case by the State High Court Kaduna to this Court, learned counsel failed to annex or exhibit the said Ruling of Hon. Justice Kurada of the High Court of Kaduna State. Nevertheless, by a letter dated 04/12/2018, from the Honourable Acting Chief Judge of the High Court of Kaduna State, Honourable Justice Muhammadu Lawal Bello (now the Honourable Chief Judge) this case was transferred to this Honourable Court.
16. Now, the provision of Section 24 (3) of the NICA (supra) in contention provides as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment or law, no cause or matter shall be struck out by the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on the ground that such cause or matter was not brought in the appropriate Court in which it ought to have been brought, and the Court before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Division of the Court in accordance with such rules of Court as may be in force in that High Court or made under any enactment or law empowering the making of rules of Court generally which enactment or law shall by virtue of this subsection be deemed to include the power to make rules of Court for the purposes of this section."
In the case of John Vs Igbo-Etiti Local Government Area  7 NWLR (Pt 1352) 1, it was interpreted that this provision was a directive to the Federal High Court and High Court of States not to strike out a matter where it finds out that it possesses no jurisdiction to entertain same and that such Federal High Court or High Court should instead transfer the matter under its own Rules of Court to the National Industrial Court. This exercise of power of transfer of cases to the National Industrial Court by the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is however not a ‘free for all' affair and it is dependent on the High Court concerned possessing the power of transfer either under its High Court Law or its Rules of Court.
17. I should remark that the above authority and the authorities of Fasakin Foods (Nig) Ltd Vs Shosanya (supra);Akporido Vs Petroleum Training Institute (supra); Alabi Vs National Assembly(supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the Defendant to convince this Court that the Federal High Court and State High Courts cannot transfer cases to the National Industrial Court of Nigeria without the Rules of the said Courts, no longer represent the current or correct position of the law on the issue.
This is in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Musa Ismaila Maigana Vs Industrial Training Fund in Suit No: SC/535/2004 delivered on 18/12/2020 where the Apex Court per Okoro, JSC held as follows:
“It is clear from the wordings of Section 24(3) of NICA the intention of the legislature is to preserve suits pending before the various Federal and State High Courts prior to when the Third Alteration Act 2010 was passed into law. Section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act and Section 24 (3) of the NICA aimed at avoiding a miscarriage of justice to party who after the commencing an action before the Federal High Court or High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory would have his case thrown out after they were divested of jurisdiction to entertain the matter.”
18. It is perhaps significant to state that by reviewing the previous position of law as it relates to the provision of Section 24 (3) NICA on transferring of a suit by Courts that lacked jurisdiction to this Honourable Court, it is the view of this Court that, it is to prevent the untold hardship inherent in striking out of matters and the avoidance of miscarriage of justice that precipitated the current position for transfer of the matters, albeit, without the Rules of such Courts. I should also remark that from the content of the letter of transfer, the Hon. Chief Judge of Kaduna State has the same reasoning when the case file was remitted to this Honourable Court.
Therefore, being the most recent decision of the Apex Court on the interpretation of Section 24 (3) NICA (supra), the contention by learned counsel for the Defendant that the Claimant’s suit is unconstitutional and a nullity on the ground that the High Court of Kaduna State lacked the power of transfer, no longer represent the correct legal position. This case was properly transferred and was properly initiated. And I so hold.
19. On the issue of setting aside the order of the High Court of Kaduna State as urged by learned counsel for the Defendant, it is pertinent to restate the settled principle of law that, ordinarily and except in certain defined and specified circumstances, no court of concurrent jurisdiction has the power to review or set aside an order made by another judge or court of concurrent jurisdiction.
I cannot agree more with the submission of the learned counsel for the Claimant, that the Ruling of Kurada J. of High Court of Kaduna State is still valid and subsisting. Certainly, I do not have the jurisdiction to interfere with the decision being a decision from a Court of concurrent jurisdiction otherwise; it would amount to sitting on appeal which the law does not allow.
Without any much ado therefore, this Court is competent in law to exercise jurisdiction to entertain the suit. And I so further hold.
20. Having dealt with the substance of the varying objections raised by the learned counsel for the Defendant, the coast is now clear for the Court to proceed to determine the substance of the Claimant’s case. Now, as I earlier stated, the Defendant rested his case on the Claimant’s. The legal implication of resting the case of the Defence on that of the Claimant is that where a Defendant does not adduce evidence, the evidence before the Court goes one way leaving the Court with no other evidence or set of facts with which to do the measuring of the scale. In a situation as the present case, where a Defendant leads no evidence in proof of the facts pleaded by him but rests his case on that of the Claimant, such pleading is deemed abandoned and the Defendant is deemed to have completely accepted both the pleadings and evidence or the case presented by the Claimant. See: U.B.N Plc Vs Astra Builders (W.A. Ltd)  5 NWLR (Pt 1186) 1; Aregbesola Vs Oyinlola  9 NWLR (Pt 1253) 458; Aondo Vs Benue Links  LPELR 46876
21. The law however, is that failure of the Defendant to adduce evidence does not, on its own, translate to automatic victory for the Claimant against the Defendant. This is because a Claimant must succeed on the strength of his case and not rely on the weakness of the defence and the absence of a Statement of Defence or evidence by the Defendant does not exonerate the responsibility on a Claimant to prove his claim. Harka Air Services Ltd Vs Keazor  1 NWLR (Pt 960) 160; Ogunyade Vs Oshunkeye  15 NWLR (Pt 1057) 218
I should at this juncture remark that the learned Defendant’s counsel in his written address made concerted attempts to give evidence for the Defendant. It is trite that the address of counsel, no matter how brilliant, cannot be the substitute of evidence.
22. Now, parties are ad idem that the Claimant granted approval for the sponsorship of the Defendant for international training for his Ph.D; that a bond was executed by parties and that the sum of N6,909,395.25 was credited by the Claimant to the Defendant’s bank account. The application letter and forms, the bond form and the e-payment mandate and payment voucher were admitted in evidence as Exhibits C1, C2 and C3 respectively.
To establish the Claimant’s case, the uncontroverted evidence of CW1 is that, the Defendant was involved in a case of examination misconduct about the same time the funds was released to the Defendant’s bank account; that a letter was immediately written to the Defendant’s Bank - UBA Plc, to freeze his account; that at the conclusion of the investigation into examination misconduct, the Defendant was indicted and removed by the Governing Council of the Claimant; that the Defendant was no longer entitled to the funds upon his removal; that the Claimant requested for the refund of the funds from the Defendant but the Defendant stated in his reply that he was unable to withdraw from his account because his account had been frozen by the Court upon the Claimant’s application.
23. CW1 testified further that thereafter, the Defendant obtained another Court’s order to unfreeze his account and that he withdrew money from the account with a credit balance of N912,577.66. CW1 also testified that the Defendant’s bank has paid the said sum of N912,577.66 to the Claimant leaving a balance of N5,996,817.59 Exhibits C5, C6, C4, C7 and C8 – the Minutes of the 55th meeting of the Governing Council, letter of removal of Defendant from office, Claimant’s letter of request to UBA to freeze or block the Defendant’s account, letter of Defendant to the Claimant, CTC of enrolment of Court’s order were admitted in evidence.
CW1 testified further that the Defendant challenged his dismissal; that his case was dismissed by this Court and that his appeal was further dismissed by the Appellate Court. The CTC of the judgements of this Honourable Court and the Court of Appeal were admitted in evidence as Exhibits C10 and C9 respectively.
24. Now, from the evidence on record, it is stating the obvious to affirm, from the onset, that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is delimitated by the bond agreement – Exhibit C3. The determination of the suit, in my view, would turn largely on the understanding of the purport of the obligations of the Defendant, in particular, with reference with the bond for the study fellowship.
I have taken a critical review of Exhibit C3, titled ‘Bond Form for a study Fellowship’. The recital thereof revealed the intention of the Defendant. It states as follows:
“Whereas, the member of staff, has applied for and has been granted a study fellowship by the University to study in University Putra Malaysia for the period of 1st August, 2014 to 31st July, 2019 (five years).”
The Bond went further to state the details of the obligations of and expectations from the Defendant with respect to the study fellowship and his entitlements during the study fellowship.
25. It is an elementary principle of contract and indeed well settled that parties are generally bound by the terms and or conditions of an agreement which they voluntarily entered into. It is also trite and as correctly submitted by the learned counsel for the Defendant that the Courts are bound by the terms of an agreement which parties before it have freely and validly executed. Thus, if a Court is called upon to construe an agreement, the Court cannot but limit itself to the express terms of the agreement as indicated and/or specified by the parties. This is because where the parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add, vary, subtract from or contradict the written terms of the contract or agreement. Therefore, where a Court is faced with the task of interpreting a written instruction or agreement from one party to the other or between two or more parties (as the case may be), it is expected that it will carry out its duty within the walls or confines of the written and express terms of the instruction or agreement. See the cases of Babatunde & Anor Vs Bank of North Ltd & Ors  LPELR 8249(SC); Chukwu & Anor Vs Chukwu & Ors  LPELR 4548.
26. The task this Honourable Court is to undertake is to examine the terms of the bond form as embodied in Exhibit C3, if by the terms or conditions therein, the Defendant has an obligation to refund to the Claimant the sponsorship fund and if so, under what circumstances?
From the totality of the testimony of the Claimant’s witness on record, it is clearly established through Exhibits C2 and C4 that the sum of N6,909,395.25 was paid into the Defendant’s UBA account on 11/08/2014 being funds for the study fellowship. It is also an established fact by Exhibits C5 and C6 that the Defendant was indicted and removed from office on 23/04/2015 and that he challenged his dismissal both at this Honourable Court and at the Appellate Court.
27. Learned Claimant’s counsel had hinged his arguments, strenuously so, on his understanding of the Claimant’s obligations under the bond. Learned counsel’s interpretation is to the effect that the Defendant must not be allowed to benefit from his wrong having been dismissed from the Claimant’s employment for serious misconduct.
Indeed, as correctly submitted by the learned counsel for the Claimant, it was held in Teriba Vs Adeyemo  LPELR - 3143 SC;  13 NWLR 242, that by applicable equitable principles:
"A person cannot benefit from his own wrong"; that it is adjudicatory function and the Court has a duty to prevent injustice in any circumstance, and avoid rendering a decision which enables a party to escape from his obligation under contract by his own wrongful act."
See also First Bank Plc Vs Standard Poly Plastic Industries Ltd  LPELR - 44081; PDP Vs Ezeonwuka & Anor  LPELR - 42563 (SC)
Learned Defendant’s counsel argued that the understanding of the Defendant’s obligations under the bond is restricted only to the study fellowship but not with respect to refund of the study fellowship funds that has been released before the Defendant’s employment was dismissed. In other words, the exercise of the Defendant’s obligations under the bond must relate strictly to the study fellowship by the Defendant and no more.
28. I totally agree with the submission of the learned Defendant’s counsel. I have carefully reviewed the entirety of the terms, clauses and conditions agreed by parties in Exhibit C3. The obligations of the parties as outlined in the exhibit are simple and straightforward. No portion thereof contains any term or clause requiring the Defendant to refund the funds of the study fellowship upon determination of his appointment with the Claimant. My respectful view is that the learned Claimant’s counsel’s arguments with respect of his interpretation and understanding of the Defendant’s obligations under the bond appears to be extensive and/or beyond the walls or confines of the written and express terms of the bond.
Furthermore, CW1 while answering questions under cross-examination also testified that there was no document by the Claimant to convey to the Defendant that the bond had been terminated by reason of his dismissal from the Claimant.
29. It is rather sad, that the Defendant has eloped with almost N6M and thus, escaped responsibility, taking advantage of the law of sanctity of contract. In the circumstances of this case, and unfortunately so, the Court’s position in Teriba Vs Adeyemo (supra) cannot be invoked as this Court with the circumstances of the case is limited to the express terms of the agreement as indicated and/or specified by the parties in Exhibit C3. The Defendant has no obligation under the contract to refund the sum under any circumstances and so, he cannot be said to have escaped from his obligation under the contract by the wrongful act as alleged by the Claimant.
30. The result therefore is the Claimant has thereby failed woefully to prove the claims and therefore not entitled to the refund of the money being claimed. I hereby resolve the two issues set down for determination against the Claimant. The judgment of the Court is that the claims of the Claimant is lacking in merit and in substance. It shall be and it is hereby accordingly dismissed.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.
SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI
M. B. Tanko Esq. for Claimant
Maxwell Kyon Esq. for Defendant