IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT CALABAR
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE M. N ESOWE
DATE: 4TH DECEMBER, 2019 SUIT NO: NICN/CA/48/2016
MR PROMISE ONETE …………………………………. CLAIMANT
BAO YAO HUAN JIAN IRON AND STEEL GROUP CFTZ ……….. DEFENDANT
OLIVER A. OSANG Esq for the Claimant
N.E IYAMBA Esq for the Defendant
This suit was instituted by the Claimant vide a Complaint dated and filed 2nd November, 2016 seeking the following reliefs:
1. The sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as compensatory or General Damages for the traumatic amputation of the Claimant’s left index and middle fingers caused by the negligent act of Defendant’s staff and malfunctioning machine of the Defendant
2. The sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) being cost of action
SUMMARY OF FACTS
According to the Claimant, he was employed and deployed o the Scrap Cutting Unit of the Defendant company. On the 5th of July, 2010, while on duty, he lost his left index and middle fingers due to the negligent act of a staff of the Defendant who operated the machine coupled with the obsolete nature of the machine. The incidence took place at the instance of one of the staff of the Defendant who switched on the machine while the Claimant was cleaning it up. The sudden switch on cut off the index and middle fingers of the Claimant. The Claimant is therefore desirous of seeking compensation for injury and loss of his fingers.
On the part of the Defendant, from their statement of defence dated and filed 26th January, 2017, they stated that the negligence leading to the loss of the fingers of the Claimant was not as a result of negligence of their staff or obsolete machine as claimed by the Claimant. Rather, it was the negligence of the Claimant whom, while the machine was yet to be switched off, proceeded to load the machine with ion scraps. After this, series of event took place which included the summons of the Defendant by the Cross River State House of Assembly arising from the petition written by the Claimant about not being compensated after the accident. While acting on the recommendation/resolution of the Cross River state House of Assembly, the Claimant was paid his salaries from July, 2010 to December, 2010; he was asked to report back to work starting January, 2011 which he refused to so do; he was asked to submit his medical report for onward transmission to the Company’s insurance firm for proper calculation of what he is entitled to as compensation to which he delayed in submitting, such delay led to the failure to pay him compensation as the time allowed had elapsed. Furthermore, Defendant stated that this action is statute barred, and it is aimed at extorting money from the Defendant.
On receipt of the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, Claimant filed a reply dated 5th April, 2017 and filed 6th April, 2017. He stated that he was never trained on how to load the Scrap Cutting Machine and the accident did not take place while he was loading the machine but when he was cleaning it - which was a rotational routine when the machine was suddenly switched on by a member of staff of the Defendant. The negligence was not on him but the member of staff of the Defendant who switched on the machine when he was cleaning it. That he did not delay in submitting the medical report, rather, he submitted when he got it from the University of Calabar Teaching Hospital on 7th February, 2017. He stated further that the suit is not statute barred.
COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING
Hearing in this suit commenced on the 13th of November, 2018 to which the Claimant himself testified as CW1. He adopted his witness statement on oath, tendered documents admitted as exhibits and he was cross examined subsequently. Thereafter, Claimant closed his case on 13th March, 2018.
On the part of the Defendant, she opened her defence on the 20th of June, 2018 by calling one Festus Olukiran who testified as DW1 on behalf of the Defendant. He adopted his Witness Statement on Oath. He was led in evidence in chief by Counsel to Defendant. He was cross examined by Counsel to Claimant. Defendant closed their defence on the 10th of July, 2019.
Thereafter, the case was adjourned to enable parties file, exchange and adopt their final written addresses.
DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS
In Defendant’s final written address filed 13thSeptember, 2019, Learned Counsel to Defendant formulated four (4) issues for determination:
1. Whether by the effect of Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004, the substantive suit herein, Suit No: NICN/CA/48/2016 is not statute barred.
2. Whether from the totality of the evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant herein has made out a case of negligence against the Defendant
3. Whether the evidence of Claimant’s sole witness is not in variance with his pleadings
4. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N500,00.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only as cost of litigation.
ON ISSUE 1: Whether by the effect of Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004, the substantive suit herein, Suit No: NICN/CA/48/2016 is not statute barred.
Learned Counsel submitted that a cause of action accrues on the date on which the incident giving rise to the cause of action arose. He referred Court to the case Okenwa V. Military Governor of Imo State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 507) 154 at 167; Adekoya V. Federal Housing Authority (2008) 4 SC 167. He submitted that cause of action is determined by looking at the averment in the Statement of Claim and the reliefs claimed. He referred Court toCharles V. Governor of Ondo State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1338)289.
Learned Counsel, while referring to reliefs 1 and 2 of the Claimant’s claim and paragraph 3 of Claimant’s Statement of Facts, posited that the cause of action in this suit accrued on 5th July, 2010. Therefore, this suit which was filed in 2016 is statute barred as it contravenes Section 16 Limitation Law Cap L. 14 Laws of Cross River State which provides as follows:
No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in part 1 and 2 of this law shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action accrued
He therefore urged the Court to hold that the present suit is caught up by the Limitation Law Cap. L.14, Laws of Cross River State, 2004.
ON ISSUE 2: Whether from the totality of the evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant herein has made out a case of negligence against the Defendant
Learned Counsel to Defendant submitted that in the case of Odinaka V. Moghalu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) Page 1 at 15, Akpata JSC defined negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, under similar circumstances would do or, the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. He submitted that negligence is a question of fact and not law. A Claimant who alleges negligence is required to state or give particulars of the negligence alleged. It is not sufficient for a Claimant to make a blanket allegation of negligence without giving full particulars of the items of negligence relied on as well as the duty of care owed him by the Defendant.
Learned Counsel, while referring to paragraph 3 and 21 (1) of Claimant’s Statement of Facts, submitted that the Claimant failed or neglected to lead any evidence in proof of the allegations made.
He therefore urged the Court to dismiss this suit for lacking in merit.
ISSUE 3: Whether the evidence of Claimant’s sole witness is not in variance with his pleadings
Learned Counsel to Defendant submitted that the evidence of the Claimant's Sole
Witness is grossly at variance with the Claimant's pleadings as contained
in his Statement of Facts filed on 2nd November, 2016 and his Reply to the
Defendant’s Statement of Defence filed on 6th April, 2017.In paragraph 3 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts, Claimant averred that he lost his left index and middle fingers due to the negligent act of one of the staff of the Defendant who operated the machine and
coupled with the fact that the said machine was obsolete. Under Cross Examination on 7th February, 2019, the Claimant's Sole Witness, contrary to the facts stated in his pleadings, testified as follows
I did not say I had an accident because the machine I was working with was old and faulty and outdated.
Learned Counsel submitted further that in paragraph 6 of the Claimant's Statement of Fact, the Claimant averredthat he was employed as an untrained, unskilled personnel to work in the scrap cutting unit of the Defendant company. Same was confirmed in paragraph 7 of Claimant's Statement sworn to on 2nd November, 2016 and paragraph 1 of the Claimant’s Reply to the Defendant’s Statement of Defence filed on 6th April, 2017. However, during Cross Examination on 13th March, 2019, the same Witness testified as follows:
The day I worked was for testing my skills and not for them to show me what to do and where to work. The company showed me where to work. They told me to arrange condemned iron, packing and putting them into the machine. They showed me how to put them in the machine ... they showed me how to clean the machine. I was trained on how to clean the machine.
Learned Counsel, while referring the Court further to paragraph 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Claimant's Statement of Facts and the answers elicited from the Claimant under cross examination, submitted that the testimony of the Claimant's sole witness is manifestly unreliable.
He therefore urged the Court not to attach any weight to the testimony of the Claimant's sole witness who perjured himself on several occasions under Cross Examination.
ON ISSUE 4: Whether the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N500,00.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only as cost of litigation.
Learned Counsel to Defendant submitted that the cost of litigation lies within the discretion of the Court to grant. However, it falls under the specie of special damages
which must be specifically pleaded and proved for a Claimant to be entitled to same. In the case of Fijabi Adebo Holdings Limited & Anor V. Nigeria Bottling Company Plc (2017) All FWLR (Pt. 882) Held 5 at Page 1222 particularly at 1254the Court held as follows;
Cost of prosecution is a specie of special damages which must be specifically proved. In the instant case, the Court, having found that the Claimants’ pleadings are bereft of facts to entitle them to the claim, refused to award cost of prosecuting the case.
The Court further held as follows:
Lastly, on the claim of N3,000.000.00 (Three Million Naira) only as cost of instituting and prosecuting this suit, this is a specie of special damages which must be specifically proven. Sadly the Claimants’ pleadings and Written Statement of Oath are bereft of facts which will entitle the Claimants to this claim. The Claimants have failed to prove the said claim, it therefore fails.
Learned Counsel therefore urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant's claim as to cost of litigation the Claimant having failed to place any material fact to entitle him to the award of cost for instituting and prosecuting this case.
CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS
On receipt of Defendant’s final written address, Learned Counsel to Claimant filed their final written address dated 9th October, 2019 and filed 10th October, 2019 formulating two (2) issues for determination:
1. Whether the Claimant’s case as presently constituted is caught by the provisions of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004, and same rendered statute barred
2. Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought
ON ISSUE 1: Whether the Claimant’s case as presently constituted is caught by the provisions of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004, and same rendered statute barred
Learned Counsel to Claimant submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Sifax (Nig.) Ltd V. Migfo (Nig.) Ltd  9 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1623) Pg. 183 ratio 1 defines cause of action and further distinguished same from action as follows:
..facts or combination of facts which a plaintiff must adduce to be entitled to any relief, the action itself is the medium through which the plaintiff litigates his bundle of facts. Put differently, a plaintiff's right of action eventuates from the existence of a cause of action
Learned Counsel submitted that in order to ascertain a cause of action and
to determine whether an action is statute barred, the immediate
materials a court should look at are the writ of summons and the
averments in the statement of claim and the reliefs sought. That the Defendant's Counsel failed, in their argument, to look at other averments in the statement of facts to take into consideration the period the parties engaged in dialogue and negotiation for compensation. He submitted that the accrual of cause of action is the state whereby a cause of action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can begin to maintain his action. Time begins to run when the cause of action crystallizes or becomes complete. The time a cause of action accrued or arose determines whether a cause of action is statute barred. In the instant case of the Claimant and the totality of the evidence adduced, the accrual of the cause of action is the refusal by the Defendant to compensate the Claimant for the injury sustained
which was continuous. Flowing from same, Claimant's cause of action accrued or
arose on the 26th July, 2016 when the Defendant failed to heed to
the final demand notice of the Claimant as contained in Exhibit
It is the submission of Learned Counsel that time does not run when parties are engaged in dialogue and negotiation. The cause of action crystallizes when the dialogue and negotiation failed.
ON ISSUE 2: Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought
Learned Counsel to Claimant submitted that the hallmark of the Claimant's case is his injury, failure and refusal by the Defendant to compensate him. The Defendant in her statement of defence and evidence-in-chief never denied that the Claimant is entitled to compensation for the injury. Facts admitted need no further proof. Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011provides thus:
No fact needs to be proved in any civil proceeding which the parties to the proceeding or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by the pleadings:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions
Learned Counsel submitted that Paragraphs 17 (i) and (ii) of the Defendant's statement of defence and paragraph 21 (a) of the Defendant's witness statement on oath is a clear admission of the fact that the Claimant is entitled to compensation. The Defendant's lone witness further admitted during cross examination that the Claimant was entitled to compensation but he could not be compensated due to the delay in submitting Exhibit C9 and that the insurance (ARM) company closed down her office in Calabar due to low patronage.
It is the submission of Learned Counsel that from the totality of the evidence adduced by the Claimant, he has proved his case in accordance with the provisions of section 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 taking into consideration exhibits C1 to C12.
DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINT OF LAW
On receipt of Claimant’s final written address, Learned Counsel to Defendant filed a reply dated 16thOctober, 2019 and filed 18thOctober, 2019 to which he replied on points of law to the Claimant’s final written address, and adumbrated further on their earlier final written address.
Having gone through the case of the Claimant, defence of the Defendant, evidence adduced at trial and the submissions of Counsel to the Claimant and Counsel to the Defendant, this Court has distilled two issues for determination, to wit:
1. Whether the suit herein is caught by Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004
2. Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.
ISSUE 1: Whether the suit herein is caught by Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004
By virtue of Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Cross River State, 2004, no action founded on contract, tort can be brought after the expiration of five years from the date the cause of action accrued. What, therefore, is a cause of action and at what stage can a cause of action be said to have accrued?
Cause of action has been defined by the Courts to mean a combination of facts and circumstances giving rise to the right to file a claim in Court for a remedy. It includes all those things which are necessary to give a right of action and every material fact which is material to be proved to entitle the Claimant to succeed. See Patkun Industries Ltd V. Niger shoes Ltd (1988) 5NWLR (Pt.93) 138; Ibrahim V. Osim (1987) 4NWLR (Pt.67) 965; Bello V. A.G Oyo State (1986) 5NWLR (Pt.45) 828.
In determining the period of limitation, the Court looks at the time the cause of action accrued and compare same with the Writ of summons or Complaint as in this case. The Court can do this without calling oral evidence. If the time of the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law, then the suit is statute barred.
However, the limitation law on its own is not a blanket rule without exceptions. The Supreme Court, which is the Apex Court of the land, has propounded and expounded the exceptions to the limitation law as can be gleaned from the cases of Attorney General of Rivers State V. Attorney General Of Bayelsa State (2013) 3NWLR (Pt.1340) 123; Aremo II V. Adekaye (2004) All FWLR (Pt.224) 2113; FGN V. Zebra Energy Ltd (2002) 18NWLR (Pt.798) 162and Inspector General of Police V. Olatunji 21 NLR 52. Such exceptions are:
a. Cases of continuance of damage or injury
b. Cases of recovery of land
c. A situation where the person relying on it acted outside the colour of his office or outside his statutory or constitutional duty. See the dictum of Galadima, JSC in A.G Rivers V. A.G Bayelsa (supra)
d. Breaches of contract
e. Claims for work and labour done. See the Dictum of Mohammed JSC in FGN V. Zebra Energy Ltd (supra)
f. Acts done in bad faith. See Inspector General of Police V. Olatunji (supra)
Generally, cases of when a cause of action accrued for the purpose of the application of the statute of limitation is more of a matter of fact than law. Each case is therefore best determined based on the facts of the case. In the case herein, the Claimant claims compensation for injury sustained at place of work in July, 2010. One can therefore say that the incidence giving rise to the claim for compensation was set off in July, 2010. However, one cannot say that the accident that happened at work place in July, 2010 is an end to itself. This is so because after the accident, there were series of demands and negotiations between the Claimant and the Defendant in a bid to compensate the Claimant for the injury sustained which included a meeting with the committee of the Cross River State House of Assembly which made some recommendations for the parties. Even from the pleadings of the Defendant, they seem to make me believe that they wanted and were interested in paying the Claimant compensation for the injury sustained provided the Claimant was willing to submit the medical report to them for onward transmission to the Insurance Company that would pay the Claimant compensation, until, according to them, Claimant delayed in submitting the medical report and time elapsed at the time he so did. In all of these, the Court will be right to say that for every time demand was made and for every time such demand was met with outright or partial rejection, it gave rise to a cause of action; for every time meetings were held to resolve how the Claimant can be compensated and such resolution was out rightly or partially unfulfilled, it gave rise to an action. Furthermore, on matters of money and debt, the Supreme Court held in A.G Adamawa State & 15 Ors V. A.G of the Federation (2014) 6-7 MJSC (Pt. 111)124 @ 129 that where a right of action has accrued to recover a debt, and the person liable therefore has acknowledged the debt, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment. If I was to apply the decision of the Supreme Court in A.G Adamawa (supra) to the case herein, the Court could not help but hold that the cause of action in this suit accrued at no other time than when the Defendant acknowledged to pay compensation to the Claimant provided he submitted his medical report. On submitting the said report, compensation was not paid, only for the Defendant to now say that he delayed and time for submitting the report for compensation to be paid had elapsed. This action on the part of the Defendant resonated/birthed a cause of action against them especially if they can tell someone to bring a medical report and after bringing it, turn around to say they can no longer pay compensation because time has elapsed. Also, arising from the exception of cases of continuance of damage or injury, the Court could also hold that inasmuch as the Defendant is yet to pay the Claimant compensation, the damage/injury has not abated. In all of these, the point the Court is trying to make here is that as lofty as the law of limitation may be to the party raising it, the limitation law only acts as a shield to the person relying on it but not as a sword to cut off an aggrieved litigant or deprive the Court from hearing the matter on the merit. In this sense, whenever the Court can apply any of the exceptions for it to decide the case on the merit, the Court will be more than willing to so do. In the case herein, given the circumstances and facts of the case, this Court is hard put to hold that Section 16 of the Cross River State Limitation Law, 2004is applicable. In this vein, this Court finds, and I so hold that the case herein is not caught by the Cross River State Limitation Law and therefore not statute barred inasmuch as the Defendant has neglected/failed to pay compensation to the Claimant till date. It is a case of continuance of damage/injury, and I so hold.
ISSUE 2: Whether the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.
Generally, civil suits are determined on preponderance of evidence. The Claimant wins or loses given the nature of his pleadings and evidence led in support of same. Moreso, the defence succeeds or fails based on the facts averred to in his Statement of Defence and evidence led in support of same. See the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramonu Rufai Apena & Anor V. Oba Fatai Aileru & Anor (2014) 6 – 7 MJSC (Pt. 11) 184 @ 188. In the case herein, the Claimant is claiming compensation for injury sustained at the place of work. According to the Claimant, a member of staff of the Defendant switched on the machine when he was clearing craps from the machine. This negligent act led to the cutting of his index finger and the middle finger. He also alluded this negligence to the faulty machine or obsolete machine of the Defendant. Whereas the Defendant is not denying that it was the scrap cutting machine that cut the fingers of the Claimant, they however stated that the negligence was not from any other member of their staff but the Claimant himself. They also denied that their machine is obsolete or faulty. I must say that besides saying that the machine was faulty or obsolete, there is no evidence before me to substantiate same. The trite law is that he who alleges must prove. Having failed to lead evidence in support of faulty or obsolete machine, the Claimant is hereby deemed to have abandoned his pleadings on faulty or obsolete machine, and I so hold. See University of Ilorin V. Rasheedat Adesina (2010) 9NWLR (Pt.1199) p.331 @351where the Court held:
No matter how impressive a party’s pleadings may be, it is of no consequence if not supported by concrete and credible evidence in proof thereof. Where no evidence is adduced in support of averments in pleadings, such averments are deemed abandoned.
On negligence arising from the Claimant or any other staff of the Defendant thereby leading to the cutting off of the index finger and the middle finger of the Claimant, this Court is satisfied from the evidence before it that the machine was not in idle mode when the fingers of the Claimant were cut off but in working mode. If for any reason the Defendant is now saying that it was not switched on after the Claimant started clearing scraps from it but before he started clearing craps for it, then, the Defendant had to do more to lead evidence in support of the alleged training they gave the Claimant on how to do the job – whether the training was specifically on Claimant to clear the scraps when the engine was in working mode or when the engine/machine was in idle mode. It is not enough for Defendant to allege that he went against his training; they must lead evidence in support of same. Failure to so do will be deemed to be abandonment of such pleadings, and I so hold.
Furthermore, another defence rendered by the Defendant is that the Claimant failed to submit the medical report to effect his compensation on time. They pleaded that the insurance company could no longer pay, the time for submission of the medical report having elapsed. Whereas this Court is of the opinion that it would have done the Defendant more good if she tendered a copy of the insurance policy before this Honourable Court to enable the Court savour the meal of time for payment having elapsed as prepared by the Defendant, it seems to me that the Defendant thinks differently. Be that as it may, this Court relies on cold facts and evidence in support of same and failure of the Defendant to lead evidence that such alleged insurance policy really exists is fatal to their case, and I so hold.
On compensation arising from injury sustained at work place, the Employees Compensation Act, 2010 makes provision for same. Section 1 of the Employees Compensation Act, 2010 provides:
1. The objectives of the Act are to –
(a) Provide for an open and fair system of guaranteed and adequate compensation for all employees or their dependants for any death, injury, disease or disability arising out of or in the course of employment.
Section 7 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, provides as follows:
1. Any employee, whether or not in a workplace, who suffers any disabling injury arising out of or in any course of employment shall be entitled to payment of compensation in accordance with Part IV of this Act
2. An employee is entitled to payment of compensation with respect to any accident sustained while on the way between the place of work and –
a. The employee’s principal or secondary residence
b. The place where the employee usually takes meals; or
c. The place where he usually takes remuneration, provided that the employer has prior notification of such place
It is glaring from the foregoing that an employee who sustains injury at the place of work or in the course of carrying out his duties in or outside the place of work is entitled to compensation. It is immaterial whether the injury was caused as a result of the negligence of another member of staff. The Employee’s Compensation Act cited above makes no distinction on whether or not the injury is caused by another member of staff of the Defendant.
On the measure of compensation or method of computing the compensation, by virtue of Sections 17, 22, 24 & 25 of the Employees Compensation Act, the compensation can be calculated based on the severity of the injury and the disability suffered; the monthly salary of the victim; the number of his dependants and the possibility of whether or not he can still work. In the case herein, besides the fact that the Claimant claims the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as compensation, there is nothing before me on the monthly salary earned by the Claimant to enable me deduce his employment financial status; there is nothing before me on the number of his dependants to enable me measure what he can be entitled to as compensation. The point here is that Claimant has failed to justify the N50,000.000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) he is claiming as compensation. In this regard, the Court can only use its discretion in awarding a reasonable amount as compensation given what she sees rather than what she does not see. What the Court sees in this case is a finger cut off and a dangling finger which, so far, has been treated; It is also a picture of a young man who can still be eligible for work even though he may no longer work up to optimum capacity due to the decapitation of his two fingers on the left hand; a picture of a young man who was employed not as a professional but a casual staff. From these pieces of evidence, this Court is not minded to grant any sum in the region of N50,000,000.00 as compensation. From the foregoing, the Court will rather award the sum of N3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as compensation.
On the position of the Defendant that the evidence adduced at trial is in variance with the pleadings of the Claimant, I have taken a keen look at the pleadings and evidence adduced at trial, there is no fundamental difference between what was alleged and evidence adduced at trial as touching on compensation of the Claimant.
From all that have been said above, the case of the Claimant succeeds only to the following extent:
CLAIM 1 Succeeds only to the extent that the Defendant shall pay the Claimant the sum of N3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as compensation for injury sustained at workplace.
CLAIM 2 Succeeds only to the extent that the Defendant shall pay the Claimant the sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) as cost.
For the avoidance of doubt, the order/declaration(s) of the Court are as follows:
1. THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS the Defendant to pay Claimant the sum of N3,000,000.00 (Three Million Naira) as compensation for injury sustained at workplace by the Claimant which injury resulted in the traumatic amputation of the Claimant’s left index and middle fingers.
2. THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) as cost.
Judgment entered accordingly.
HON. JUSTICE M.N ESOWE